Facebook diplomacy: How the Manila-Beijing public correspondence is taxing ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy
The Philippines' strategy of assertive transparency is testing ASEAN's consensus-based diplomacy while redefining regional responses to the South China Sea.
The recent controversies surrounding the release of an AI-generated video by China Daily with a monkey dressed in a barong have triggered a diplomatic protest from the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs. While this specific incident of public correspondence triggered an official response, this is not the first time that officials of the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have taken diplomacy from traditional channels to social media.
The first manifestations of social media correspondence between the two entities sparked in 2023, shortly after Jay Tarriela was appointed as the Spokesperson of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) for the West Philippine Sea (WPS). Their approach of posting high-definition footage and official statements on X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook to expose Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) gray-zone tactics opened the doors to a more confrontational approach on the issue. Since then, the Chinese Embassy in Manila began regularly posting on Facebook directly accusing Tarriela and certain Philippine government figures of ‘defaming’ and ‘smearing’ the PRC’s image.
In December 2025, the pattern peaked as Tarriela and Chinese Embassy Deputy Spokesperson Guo Wei were involved in an unmediated Facebook exchange by candidly re-sharing posts and counterarguing each other’s claims. For instance, a major example of this is the incident wherein the Chinese Embassy in Manila posted about the humanitarian assistance that was extended by the Chinese Navy ship (PLAN) to a ‘distressed’ Philippine fishing vessel in the South China Sea. This was followed by a statement from Tarriela highlighting the inaccuracies in the facts presented by the post, and emphasized the unreasonable presence of the PLAN within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. Far from an isolated spat, this event was immediately followed by similar exchanges, establishing a recurring pattern of what analysts identify as ‘assertive transparency.’
While the Philippines is used to seeing social media mudslinging between their local politicians, deploying this approach in foreign policy carries risks that extend far beyond domestic borders. In the lens of international relations, these can never be instances of a ‘casual’ social media exchange because the statements that the parties release carry the weight of their nation’s sovereignty and are representative of their strategic interests. By subjecting the correspondence to the public eye in real time, this is a major shift by Manila from traditional diplomatic channels to digital assertive transparency in addressing the South China Sea tensions. Beyond domestic statecraft, its friction point broadens to a clash with the ASEAN Way of quiet diplomacy.
Within ASEAN, the Philippines’ approach in bringing diplomatic matters with China into a real-time public mudslinging on social media is distinct in comparison with other ASEAN claimants. In an analysis by the Pacific Forum, they underscored the contrast of Manila’s high-visibility digital strategy with the ‘subdued approaches of other ASEAN claimants like Vietnam and Malaysia.’ As Manila transitions to assertive transparency, it introduces an approach that subjects bilateral statecraft to real-time domestic and international “audience costs.” Through exposing gray-zone encounters to public scrutiny, this strategy reshapes the ASEAN Way with effects extending to the region’s geopolitical landscape, disrupting the quiet and closed-door back channels that the Association has historically relied on to manage complex relations with major external powers like China.
Digital assertive transparency vs. the ASEAN Way
As years pass since its establishment, ASEAN has strictly adhered to quiet diplomacy in resolving tensions with respect to the ASEAN Way of conflict resolution. Although numerous critics on the framework have emerged as it shows its vulnerabilities to the volatile world order, preceding cases where it successfully managed complex bilateral dynamics have established a high level of credibility. Built on the principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and quiet diplomacy, this framework protects regional stability by allowing governments to negotiate away from public scrutiny. It is not without merit that multiple think tanks have claimed the Association to be one of the most successful of its kind, with one even going as far as claiming it as a ‘living, breathing modern miracle. When an individual ASEAN member state (AMS) unilaterally alters its approach to conflict management with external partners, it creates systemic friction that risks fragmenting the bloc’s collective cohesion and compromising its standing as the primary diplomatic anchor of the Indo-Pacific.
Pitting the current social media campaign of the Marcos Jr. administration against traditional quiet diplomacy reveals a fundamental operational clash in three major areas. First, in negotiations. ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy functions by relying on behind-the-scenes negotiations, while assertive transparency is fueled by public discourse. Second, in consultation and consensus. ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy ensures that no single member state can force the bloc into external rivalries, while assertive transparency involves candid, unilateral statements from public officials that suggest uncalculated correspondence. Third, in engagement processes. ASEAN’s quiet diplomacy favors confidential communication channels and closed sessions over public ultimatums while assertive transparency broadcasts real-time tensions in social media. Drawing from these distinctions, Manila’s current approach generates more audience costs than what the ASEAN Way would warrant. This contrast not only challenges the ASEAN etiquette but also structurally degrades the non-confrontational climate required for back-channel statecraft to function.
The code of conduct gridlock and the Chairship paradox
On the 10th Anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award, ASEAN, as a collective body, has not participated, and rightfully so, as they have positioned the organization to strictly enforce consensus-based decision-making. This is not an alarming isolation because AMS has historically managed security issues through official ASEAN proceedings, such as defense and maritime cooperation agreements. In fact, ASEAN has facilitated developments on the negotiations for its South China Sea (SCS) Code of Conduct (COC). With the SCS workshop series being launched by Indonesia in the late 1980s, it has established the groundwork for ASEAN and China to manage the tensions in the maritime area through formal channels, as concretized by the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. As the Philippines chairs ASEAN this year, the foundational groundwork set by precedent documents is expected to be leveraged into a more concrete ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct by the end of its term. Regardless of the major strides, the current progress may be impeded as assertive transparency poses questions to the role of the Philippines as an impartial consensus-builder, being the ASEAN Chair.
Beyond putting its chairship into a paradox, Manila’s assertive transparency is inadvertently subverting Southeast Asian security. This is exhibited in three key mechanisms that shift the geopolitical landscape of the organization: minilateralism outside ASEAN, strategic ambiguity, and forced narrative warfare. On the first mechanism, by laying bare the limits of the ASEAN Way, it accelerates a regional pivot toward overlapping, case-specific mini-laterals, forcing regional maritime security measures to evolve outside ASEAN-centric platforms. On the second mechanism, by converting real-time maritime tensions into undeniable public evidence, Manila removes the space for regional capitals to maintain passive strategic hedging, exposing a stark rift within ASEAN between frontline maritime claimants and quiet mainland states. On the third mechanism, the main impact of Manila’s digital campaign is that it has altered Beijing’s operational behavior. With forced audience costs as their actions are subjected to global public opinion, China has had to expand its posture from physical enforcement at sea to an asymmetric narrative warfare and state-sponsored legal critiques that transform the South China Sea from a localized maritime dispute into a multi-tiered domain of international lawfare.
Beyond the feed and China’s legal counter-offensive
At the peak of the public mudslinging ahead of the 10th Anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award, China Institute for Maritime Affairs released a report titled ‘Historical and Legal Critique of the Philippines’ Territorial Claims in the South China Sea.’ The document critically analyzed the claims of the Philippines on its ‘grounds to support its territorial sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands,’ by invoking the principle of estoppel and alleging contradictions in historical Philippine maps. CIMA concluded that the Philippines lacks the valid historical and legal grounds relative to the acquisition of territories to assert its ownership over these maritime features.
To counter the challenges posed by Beijing’s legal counter-offensive, one reality becomes clear: with ASEAN prioritizing reverence for the principle of non-interference, the Philippines must move beyond relying on social media correspondence and moral appeals alone. While assertive transparency immediately exposes gray-zone aggression, it must seek alternative ways to assert its legitimacy as a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute. However, lawfare itself is not a panacea. Shifting the correspondence from social media to legal treatises does not guarantee compliance from a major power, nor does it automatically yield enforceable resolutions on the dispute. In this regard, the ASEAN-backed South China Sea Code of Conduct becomes one of the most valuable armor of the Philippines. Rather than engaging in informal bilateral exchanges on social media, Manila must shift its focus to leveraging its chairship and amplify its diplomatic efforts to ensure that ASEAN operates as a unified entity when negotiating the COC with external powers.
Preserving the rules-based order, the ASEAN Way, and the South China Sea COC
Manila’s digital campaign has evoked unprecedented changes that yielded effects beyond its bilateral relationship with Beijing, extending as far as introducing new layers to South China Sea diplomacy for ASEAN. However, as Beijing expands its counters from social media narratives to institutional legal white papers, assertive transparency cannot rely on real-time Facebook drops alone. To sustain its credibility beyond the 2026 ASEAN Chairship, the Philippines must leverage its strategy to effectively engage in symmetrical counter-lawfare with China.
After the Philippines, Singapore is set to chair ASEAN in 2027. With consistent bilateral meetings between PM Lawrence Wong and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., both parties have committed to a smooth transition of the chairship. In line with this, Singapore offers the crucial institutional bridge to absorb Manila’s public momentum and redirect it toward a binding South China Sea Code of Conduct. While this offers leverage, Manila remains at risk of geopolitical entrapment if it sustains its current approach. However, by pairing public transparency with closed-door statecraft, Manila can effectively advance its claims on maritime rights without fracturing the ASEAN Way or eroding ASEAN Centrality in the broader Indo-Pacific order.
This article reflects reporting and analysis made by The Southeast Asia Pacific Frontier. If you have additional context, a different take, or a perspective we’ve missed — whether you’re a researcher, a policy practitioner, or someone living with these realities on the ground — this is an evolving story and we’d like to hear from you. Drop a comment below or get in touch.
About Maria Sofia Castro
Maria Sofia Castro is a Political Economy scholar who specializes in international relations and development. Their work focuses on analyzing how regionalization impacts economic policy and institutional bureaucracy. They currently engage with regional and multilateral organizations to conduct policy research and moderate high-level stakeholder consultations.
